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Abstract Patient organizations increasingly play an important role in health care
decision-making in Western countries. The Netherlands is one of the countries
where this trend has gone furthest. In the literature some problems are identified,
such as instrumental use of patient organizations by care providers, health insurers
and the pharmaceutical industry. To strengthen the position of patient organizations
government funding is often recommended as a solution. In this paper we analyze
the ties between Dutch government and Dutch patient organizations to learn more
about the effects of such a relationship between government and this part of civil
society. Our study is based on official government documents and existing empirical
research on patient organizations. We found that government influence on patient
organizations has become quite substantial with government influencing the orga-
nizational structure of patient organizations, the activities these organizations per-
form and even their ideology. Financing patient organizations offers the government
an important means to hold them accountable. Although the ties between patient
organizations and the government enable the former to play a role that can be valued
as positive by both parties, we argue that they raise problems as well which warrant
a discussion on how much government influence on civil society is acceptable.
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Introduction
In the last two decades many western welfare states have granted their citizens more
choice and more influence in the provision of public services (housing, education,
home help, health care) be it for democratic reasons (people should have a say in
whatever affects them), for reasons of efficiency (citizens should be able to point out
what they really need, rather than be granted a standard provision), or to enhance the
quality of service delivery (professionals learn from actively choosing and
participating citizens what works and what does not) [13]. Health care is a public
sector in which active participation by citizens is supposed to do a world of good. It
is widely recognized that health care professionals should take leave of the
traditional model of paternalist medicine in which the doctor knew what was best
for his patients. They should now adhere to a model called ‘shared decision-making’
in which patient and doctor discuss treatment options together and then decide what
to do [14].
In many modern health care systems patients not only participate in decisions
concerning their own health and medical treatment. Increasingly patients also
participate in all sorts of decision-making processes at the meso and macro level [4,
58, 3]. Patients participate in decision-making on many different subjects, such as
government policy, medical guideline development, research agenda setting, insurer
policy and provider policy [11, 17, 45, 49, 58]. The most often cited reason for
patient participation is that patients bring an additional perspective based on their
experiential knowledge to the table, which may improve the quality of decisions.
Patient participation could thereby also increase the overall effectiveness and
efficiency of the health care system, since patients might offer solutions which fit
the preferences of patients better, thereby hopefully preventing mistakes and saving
costs. For example when patients are well-informed compliance will improve and
patients may learn how to manage their own care [8, 18, 22, 23, 26]. Patient
participation is also proposed for democratic reasons. Democratic legitimacy would
increase when patients participate; parties who reap the benefits or suffer the
consequences from certain decisions ought to have a say in the process.
Participation might also have an empowerment effect on those who participate;
patients who are given a say in policy processes acquire a sense of self-efficacy [5,
11, 22, 58]. In short, the expectations of patient participation in health care decision-
making are high. Research shows, however, that not all expectations are met [6, 11,
49, 55, 58]. Patients have difficulty in actually influencing the process. Sometimes
patient participation is mere tokenism [49] and at other times patients are put to
instrumental use by more powerful actors in health care, such as care providers,
insurers and guideline development organizations [24, 58].
According to researchers as well as policy makers, the position of patients can be
strengthened when they are organized. Civil society organizations such as patient
organizations could play an important role in facilitating democracy and bringing
the interests of certain groups to the fore [4, 16, 41]. However, the difficulties
encountered with regard to individual participation seem to pop up also when
participation takes place through patient organizations: representatives of patient
organizations may also be manipulated, and representatives of patients do not
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always feel able to really influence decision-making processes [4, 3, 58]. It is
therefore argued by policy makers, patient organizations and researchers that patient
organizations should professionalize in order to strengthen their position [4, 34, 50].
To professionalize patient organizations need money. Often membership dues are
insufficient to finance paid staff members. If membership dues are too high, patients
will choose to do without membership, as much of the information which used to be
provided by patient organizations is now freely available on the internet [36]. Hence
patient organizations have to search for additional funds. One way of increasing
their financial means is through donations by the pharmaceutical industry. However,
this strategy is heavily contested, since accepting money from the pharmaceutical
industry may threaten the organizations’ independence and may increase the danger
of being put to instrumental use [3, 27, 32]. As the input of patients and the role of
patient organizations are valued by many it is therefore argued that government
should subsidize these organizations to enable them to play a strong role in health
care decision-making. In several countries government subsidizes patient organi-
zations [4, 31, 35]. In this article we will explore the ties between government and
patient organizations in the Netherlands to see whether this is a viable strategy to
ensure patient participation in decision-making while keeping patient organizations
out of the hands of the pharmaceutical industry.
Patient participation through patient organizations has perhaps gone furthest in
the Netherlands [58]. Dutch patient organizations are called the official ‘third party’
in health care, next to health care insurers and providers. This role has been assigned
to them by the Dutch government and means that they are asked to participate in
many official decision-making processes to represent the patient perspective (ibid.).
Patient organizations have become ‘insider groups’, which means that they are
regarded as legitimate players by government and are consulted on a regular basis
(cf [21]). At present there is a wide variety of patient organizations in the
Netherlands [35, 39]. There are over 300 different organizations, about 200 of which
are disease specific organizations [7].1 Together the disease specific organizations
have about half a million members [39]. Besides these organizations, there are
disease group umbrella organizations2 and regional and national umbrella organi-
zations. The members of these umbrella organizations are not individual patients but
other patient organizations. All patient organizations together are often referred to
as ‘the patient movement’ [35, 39].
Dutch patient organizations rely on several financial sources. On average 27% of
the funding of disease specific organizations comes from member contributions
[39]. Some patient organizations receive funding from the pharmaceutical industry.
On average 8% of the budget of patient organizations that are sponsored by the
industry comes from the industry [44]. Obviously, not all patient organizations are
sponsored. Some organizations are simply not interesting for pharmaceutical
companies because they represent patients who suffer from a disease or affliction
1 Examples of disease specific organizations are the Parkinson Association, the Epilepsy Association and
the Lung Cancer Foundation.
2 For example the Lung Cancer Foundation and other cancer organizations are part of the Dutch Cancer
Federation (NFK).
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that cannot be cured by medication. Other patient organizations (like the client
organization for mental health patients) do not want to be sponsored by the
pharmaceutical industry on principle.
There has been quite a lot of debate, also in the media, about the ties between
patient organizations and the pharmaceutical industry, which are generally
disapproved of [9, 50]. In response to this situation some members of Parliament
argued that these financial ties are undesirable and that government funding should
increase to prevent undesirable connections [53]. In the Netherlands government
subsidies were already granted to patient organizations in the 1980s. Today
government subsidies constitute 46% of the income of disease specific organizations
[39]. Umbrella organizations also rely heavily on government subsidies. The budget
of national umbrella organizations like the National Patient and Consumer Platform
(NPCF) mostly consists of government subsidies3 [37].
Although government funding can enable patient organizations to become
stronger players in the health care field while keeping them out of the claws of the
pharmaceutical industry, it does not guarantee their independence. Government
subsidies also come with strings attached and put patient organizations under at least
some government control [3]. In this paper we will explore what happens when
patient organizations have government as their facilitator. We will answer the
following research question: In what ways does the Dutch government influence
patient organizations and how should the ties between government and patient
organizations be assessed?
Answering this question is important for several reasons. First of all it is
important to analyze what happens when patient organizations are facilitated and
subsidized by government, because this is also proposed in other countries [4, 27,
31]. Our study of the Dutch case may help to reflect on the desirability of such a
policy. Secondly, answering this question may be important for scholars who are
interested in neo-corporatism and policy networks. To our knowledge a large part of
the research on neo-corporatism and policy networks focuses on the way interest
groups influence policy making and discusses whether this influence is desirable
(see for instance [1, 12, 28, 62]). We feel it might be worthwhile to consider the
opposite question. How does government in such a relationship influence interest
groups (in this case patient organizations) and is this influence desirable? Although
policy network theorists argue that interaction between government and groups in
the policy network causes two way influence relations [4] and although researchers
sometimes observe that giving groups an insider status poses the danger of
becoming ‘servants of the centre’ [21], the influence relationship from government
to civil society organizations does not receive much attention in the literature. We
feel it is important to learn more about the way government influences civil society
groups.
In this article we will first describe the methods used in our study (Section
‘‘Methods’’). Following that we will describe Dutch government policy directed at
patient organizations and the response of these organizations to this policy (Section
3 In addition the NPCF receives funds from their members (other patient organizations) and some of its
income comes from organized activities [37].
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‘‘Results’’). In the ‘‘Conclusion and Discussion’’ section we will argue that
governmental influence on patient organizations is strong in the Netherlands, that
the ties between government and patient organizations have both positive and
negative consequences and that the latter may be a reason for all parties involved to
critically assess this situation.
Methods
To study the ties between Dutch government and Dutch patient organizations we
used different research methods. First we analyzed official policy documents
regarding patient organizations to gain insight into the ideas of government about
these organizations. Our policy document search showed that patient organizations
have been a subject of government interest from the early 1980s onwards. Our
analysis therefore consists of documents from 1980 till June 2009. An overview of
the policy documents used can be found in Table 1. An analytical scheme was
composed after reading the documents. We scrutinized all documents on the
government’s ideas about: (1) the organizational structure of the patient movement,
(2) the activities patient organizations should perform, (3) the ideology of patient
organizations and (4) the funding and accountability of patient organizations. This
enabled us to analyze different aspects of government policy toward patient
organizations.
Quite a lot of empirical research has been done into patient participation and the
role of patient organizations in the Netherlands. We studied this research to gain
insight in (1) the activities of patient organizations, (2) patient organizations’
experiences with all of these activities and (3) the way these organizations
responded to government policy plans with regard to the patient movement. An
overview of the studies used is presented in Table 2.
The analysis of the policy documents and the literature on patient organizations
in the Netherlands provided us with a comprehensive picture of the relationship
between government and the patient movement in the Netherlands.
Results
Most Dutch patient organizations were founded in the 1980s. They were founded by
patients, but often in association with or supported by health care professionals (P8).
Contacts between fellow sufferers, sharing information and providing peer support
were generally the most important reasons for the foundation of most of these
organizations (P8). People wanted information that they could understand about
their own or their children’s disease or condition and they wanted to share their
stories and learn from other people’s experiences (P8). Patient organizations
provided these services which many patients and or family members felt were
important to deal with their situation and which were not provided by the
professional health care system. For most patient organizations interest represen-
tation was not an important part of their activities during these early years. This was
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Table 1 Overview of government policy documents analyzed
Year Title Code
1981 Nota Patie¨ntenbeleid (White paper Patient Policy) G1
1983 Voortgangsnota Patie¨ntenbeleid (Follow up white paper Patient Policy) G2
1988 Tweede voortgangsnota Patie¨ntenbeleid (Second follow up white paper Patient Policy) G3
1988 Financieel overzicht jeugdhulpverlening (Financial overview youth care) G4
1992 Nota Patie¨nten/Consumentenbeleid (White paper Patient/consumer policy) G5
1995 Voortgangsbrief Nota Patie¨nten consumentenbeleid (Follow up letter white paper Patient/
consumer policy)
G6
1995 Nota Volksgezondheidsbeleid 1995–1998 (White paper Public health policy 1995–1998) G7
1997 Jaaroverzicht Zorg 1998 (Care overview 1998) G8
1997 Vaststelling van de begroting van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (XVI) voor het jaar 1998 (Assessment of the budget of
expenditures and receipts of the ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports for the year 1998)
G9
1998 Nota Marktwerking in de gezondheidszorg (White paper Market based health care) G10
1998 Vaststelling van de begroting van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (XVI) voor het jaar 1999 (Settlement of the budget of
expenditures and receipts of the ministry of Health, Well-being and Sports for the year
1999)
G11
2000 Vaststelling van de begroting van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (XVI) voor het jaar 2001 (Assessment of the budget of
expenditures and receipts of the ministry of Health, Well-being and Sports for the year
2001)
G12
2000 Vaststelling van de begroting van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport (XVI) voor het jaar 2001: voortgangsbrief over
bundeling krachten patie¨nten en consumenten organisaties (Assessment of the budget of
expenditures and receipts of the ministry of Health, Well-being and Sports for the year
2001: follow up letter on combining the power of patient/consumer organizations)
G13
2000 Zorgnota 2001 (White paper Care 2001) G14
2001 Patie¨nten/consumentenbeleid: Met zorg kiezen De toerusting van patie¨nten en consumenten
in een vraaggestuurde zorg (White paper Patient/consumer policy: Choosing with Care:
the equipment of patients and consumers in a demand driven care system)
G15
2002 Patie¨nten/consumentenbeleid: brief minister evaluatie en beleidsvoornemens over Fonds
PGO (Patient/consumer policy: letter of the minister on the evaluation and policy
resolutions concerning the PGO-fund)
G16
2004 Patie¨nten/Consumentenbeleid: voortgangsbrief (Patient/consumer policy follow up letter) G17
2007 Subsidiebeleid VWS, brief minister over de toekomstige financiering van PGO-organisaties
(White paper on subsidy policy of the ministry of Health, Well-being and Sports, letter on
the future of financing patient organizations)
G18
2007 Verslag schriftelijk overleg over versterking pgo-organisaties: reactie van de minister
(response of the minister of Health, Well-being and Sports to questions concerning the
strengthening of patient organizations)
G19
2008 Subsidiebeleid VWS, brief minister over de toekomstige financiering van PGO-organisaties
(White paper on subsidy policy of the ministry of Health, Well-being and Sports, letter on
the future of financing patient organizations)
G20
2008 Subsidiebeleid VWS, brief minister over de toekomstige financiering van PGO-organisaties
(White paper on subsidy policy of the ministry of Health, Well-being and Sports, follow up
letter on the future of financing patient organizations)
G21
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different for a few radical organizations in the mental health care sector which
struggled to make mental health care less medical and more democratic (P1, P8).
Once founded, patient organizations soon became a subject of government
interest. Government policy was directed at influencing patient organizations in
several ways. In the following subsections we will describe the government’s policy
to change their organizational structure, their activities, and their ideology and the
response of patient organizations to each of the policy proposals. Lastly we will
describe how government tried to hold patient organizations accountable through
Table 2 Overview of patient organization research analyzed
Year Authors Title Code
1989 Rijkschroeff, R.A.L. Ondersteuning van participatie in de geestelijke
gezondheidszorg (Participation support in mental health
care)
P1
2004 Nederland, T. and J.W.
Duyvendak
De kunst van effectieve belangenbehartiging door de
patie¨nten- en clie¨ntenbeweging. De praktijk (The art of
effective interest representation by the patient and client
movement: Practice)
P2
2004 Klop, R. et al. Patie¨nten doen mee bij ZonMw!. (Patients participate at
ZonMw!)
P3
2004 Van Veenendaal, H. et al. Patie¨ntenparticipatie in richtlijnontwikkeling (Patient
participation in guideline development)
P4
2005 Van Wersch, S.F.M. and
P.A.M. Van den Akker
Clie¨ntenparticipatie bij multidisciplinaire
richtlijnontwikkeling in de GGZ: Ervaringskennis is geen
kennis!? (Client participation in multidisciplinary
guideline development in mental health care: Experiential
knowledge is no knowledge!?)
P5
2005 Caron-Flinterman, J.F A new voice in science. Patient participation in decision-
making on biomedical research
P6
2007 Schut, F.T. and D. De Bruijn Collectieve zorgverzekeringen en risicoselectie (Collective
health Insurance contracts and risk selection)
P7
2008 Trappenburg, M. Genoeg is genoeg. Over gezondheidszorg en democratie
(Enough is enough: on health care and democracy)
P8
2008 Oudenampsen, D. et al. Patie¨nten en Consumentenbeweging in Beeld:
brancherapport 2007 (A description of the Patient and
Consumer movement: branchreport 2007)
P9
2008 Van de Bovenkamp, H.M.
et al.
Zaakwaarnemers van de patie¨nt (Sponsors of the patient) P10
2008 Van de Bovenkamp, H.M.
et al.
Inventarisatie patie¨ntenparticipatie in onderzoek, kwaliteit en
beleid (Inventarisation patient participation in research,
quality policy and policy making)
P11
2008 Oudenampsen, D. et al. Patie¨nten en Consumentenbeweging in Beeld:
brancherapport 2008 (A description of the Patient and
Consumer movement: branchreport 2008)
P12
2009 Sattoe, J. Belangenbehartiging belicht: een dubbelrol voor PGO-
organisaties (Interest representation: a double role for
patient organizations)
P13
2010 Van de Bovenkamp, H.M.
et al.
Patient participation in collective health care decision-
making: the Dutch model
P14
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government funding and how this worked out for patient organizations. Interestingly
the policy of the Dutch government directed at patient organizations seems to have
followed a consistent path throughout the years, despite the fact that different
political parties participated in government. Dutch political parties in subsequent
governments seem to have had similar ideas about patient organizations.
Organizational Structure
In 1981 an important white paper, entitled Patient Policy (G1), was published in
which it was argued that users of care should have a say in the provision of care in
health care institutions, in regional advisory boards and in decision-making at the
national level. Patient organizations were expected to play an important role in all of
these decision-making arenas. However, according to this document, patient
organizations were not organized in the right way to accomplish this. There were a
lot of disease specific organizations that catered for members who were often too
sick to participate in any kind of council. Even when their health was no obstacle to
participation, they did not seem to be interested in participation, since only a small
number of disease specific organizations had designated influencing policy as one of
their goals. In addition it was identified that the different organizations did only
sporadically work together. There were no regional organizations with a general
interest in health care policy. A lack of money was considered to be an important
cause of this lack of unification. Regional authorities were therefore asked to finance
patient organizations in order to create and maintain regional patient platforms,
which could represent the interests of patients and deliver expertise and knowledge
in policy making. In the first half of the 1980s regional platforms, financed with
regional governments’ money, were indeed created (G3). After their creation
government tried to influence these regional platforms further, for instance they
were admonished to give disease specific organizations a say in their activities so as
to ensure that justice was done to the diversity of the movement (G15).
In the white paper Patient Policy (G1) government not only recommended patient
organizations to organize themselves at the regional level; a national platform for
patients and health consumers was proposed as well. The development of such a
platform would be supported by government, and financing it was considered part of
this support. The national patient/consumer platform should be a suitable voice for
patients’ interests according to the government. To help position such a platform in
the field it was further proposed that representatives of the platform should serve on
a number of important advisory councils, such as the National Council for Public
Health. In 1983 a national platform for patients and consumers, the LPCP (Landelijk
Patienten en Consumenten Platform), was founded which employed activities on
general patient interest representation (P8).
In 1988 a follow up white paper on Patient Policy was published (G3). In this
paper it was argued that government policy should be directed at strengthening the
position of patient organizations further by making sure that they increasingly
worked together. To strengthen patient organizations’ position subsidies would be
increased. In another white paper on patient and consumer policy, published in
1992, the government announced that the kind of extensive participation in
336 Health Care Anal (2011) 19:329–351
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decision-making bodies expected from patient organizations required a patient
movement organized more clearly and more consistently. Ideally there should be
one identifiable powerful organization which could count on broad support (G5).
Government wanted an umbrella organization that would represent a larger part of
the patient movement than the LPCP did. This wish was granted almost
immediately. In 1992 the National Patient and Consumer Federation (NPCF), a
broader federation of coalitions of patient organizations, replaced the LPCP (G6).
The national federation and some other organizations that provided patient
organizations with support would be financed by the government, after having
been evaluated on efficacy and cooperation possibilities (G5).
Government’s interference with the organizational structure did not end with the
push for umbrella organizations; the patient movement was also asked to make sure
that there was no overlap between organizations. An evaluation of the working
method of the NPCF was announced as a way to support the development of new
strategies in the middle of the 1990s (G6). By the end of the 1990s the government
announced that a trajectory would be started, the goal of which would be obligatory
collaboration or integration of existing patient platforms (G11). In a letter to
parliament the minister of health care announced that she had asked a consultancy
firm to investigate how the NPCF and two other national platform organizations, the
Council for the disabled and the Union for the organizations of the chronically ill,
cooperated to see if there was any overlap or perhaps white spots in their activities
(G13). Before the investigation was really carried out the Council for the disabled
and the Union for the organizations of the chronically ill put two and two together
and decided to merge (P8), which was applauded by the government (G15).
In 2001 the white paper Choosing with Care was published. Again the future of
patient organizations was discussed and again government expressed its desire that
they should present a united front and that the department of health would keep a
check on the way the different levels of the patient movement worked together
(G15). This push toward more cooperation remained on the policy agenda
throughout the years (G17, G18). In 2009 the government announced that it would
like the different umbrella organizations to form one organization. The umbrella
organizations have agreed to think about this which pleases the minister of health
care (G20). Cooperation increasingly dominates the agenda of patient organizations.
Although many disease specific organizations still emphasize their uniqueness they
start to acknowledge the need to work together, because of the ever increasing
government induced demand for interest representation activities. Working together
can strengthen their position, they feel. Moreover, it gives them the opportunity to
professionalize. One patient organization alone cannot afford to hire paid staff, but
several organizations combined can, especially if working together is rewarded
financially (P10). For example, several patient organizations concentrating on heart
conditions have decided to merge in order to strengthen their interest representation
activities (P13). Other patient organizations also increasingly work together in their
interest representation tasks and in sharing information (P12).
In sum, we can say that the government successfully tried to change the
organizational structure of the patient movement several times and continues its
attempts to influence this structure.
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Activities
Government policy also included recommendations for patient organizations to
steer their activities. These directions became increasingly more specific. At first,
the original activities of patient organizations, providing information and peer
support, were valued greatly by the Dutch government (see for instance G6). In
addition, however, government would like them to perform more interest
representation activities. In the beginning of the 1980s the lack of interest of many
patient organizations in policy issues was identified with regret (G1). According to
the government patient organizations should become much more active in formal
decision-making processes.
In the late 1980s, government observed that many patient organizations had
indeed become active in committees and councils. However, according to the
government this still did not happen enough (G3). To facilitate their role in
decision-making government awarded patient representatives seats in official
advisory councils and pushed for their participation in decision-making on all kinds
of levels (G3). Government also emphasized the importance of patient involvement
in contacts with providers and insurers (G5, G6). According to the government,
patient organizations should focus on influencing insurer and provider policy as the
‘third party’ in health care, next to providers and insurers. However, since
government still played an important role in health care policy making it was argued
that patient organizations should critically follow government policy as well (G6).
The ‘third party’ discourse continues to dominate policy documents in the following
years. Consecutive ministers of health care announced that patient organizations
should be an equal partner to health care providers, insurers and the government
(G14, G19). Patient organizations on their part report that although providing
information and peer support is still important, interest representation, such as trying
to improve the quality of care, stimulating scientific research and purchasing health
care, has become very important as well and that this task has grown into a
significant part of their activities. All other actors in health care, insurers, providers,
government, researchers, intermediary and supervisory organizations, consult with
patient organizations in one form or the other (P8, P9, P10, P11, P12, P14).
Government also increasingly specified which subjects patient organizations
should become interested in. In the late 1980s for example government saw a role
for patient organizations in decision-making on medical research. Government felt
that its own role in scientific research should be more distant than before. Instead
societal organizations ought to be involved in scientific research, including patient/
consumer groups. According to the government this would lead to large societal
support and enhance the implementation of the results of scientific research (G4). A
spokesperson of the patient movement was awarded a seat on the Council of Health
research, which has an important task in advising government on research priorities.
Some years after this, patient representatives were asked as official reviewers to
comment on research proposals at ZonMw, the organization responsible for dividing
the governmental research budget in the health care sector (P3, P11). Other
initiatives include consultation of patient representatives by researchers (researchers
are required to seek patients’ advice if they want to be eligible for ZonMw research
338 Health Care Anal (2011) 19:329–351
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funds) and participation of patients in research committees (P6, P8). Some patient
organizations also perform research on their own. Thus, patient organizations have
taken these new tasks on board and try to influence research in different ways
(P8, P11, P12).
Guideline development was another area of decision-making government felt to
be important for patient organizations. In 1995 the minister stated that she would
support the involvement of patient representatives in medical guideline develop-
ment because of the experiential knowledge they would bring to the tables where
professional guidelines were discussed. Patient organizations should want to and
dare to carry joint responsibility for the content and the application of guidelines
(G7) used by medical professionals to provide care according to the best medical
knowledge. Many patient organizations do indeed participate in guideline devel-
opment since the end of the 20th century. They are asked to partake in guideline
development groups, with professionals, researchers and other experts in the field,
by organizations that develop such guidelines and they try to do so as much as
possible (P4, P10, P11).
In 2006 a new health care insurance system was introduced in the Netherlands,
based on managed competition (see also [54]). This new system provided patient
organizations with new participation possibilities. Patient organizations, as the
official third party in health care, are expected to become a countervailing power to
health care professionals and health care insurers on the health care market (G14).
Patient organizations should make sure that patient preferences are central in the
provision of care (G10, G18). In response to this governmental desire, patient
organizations now consult with both health care insurers and providers to improve
the quality of care that is provided. For example, although not standard practice yet,
insurers consult with patient organizations to learn more about criteria for health
care purchasing. Patient organizations also participate in quality projects of
providers and insurers to identify points for improvement in hospital care. In
addition some patient organizations try to monitor the quality of care that is
provided, award quality marks to care institutions that provide care according to
their criteria, and take action when they find instances of insufficient health care
provision (P10). The new health insurance act also allowed and expected patient
organizations to organize their membership into insurance purchasing groups to
negotiate better benefits for their members. Some patient organizations immediately
put this into practice. In 2007 around 50 collective contracts were closed by patient
organizations (P7) and more patient organizations are trying to negotiate similar
contracts. However, so far the contents of the collective contracts were not
impressive. Patient organizations have not been able to negotiate contracts which
offer better care for their members (P10, P14).
More activities of patient organizations were not only expected on the national
level but on the local level as well. With the introduction of the Social Support Act
(Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning, Wmo) in 2007 patient organizations are
expected to represent the interest of patients in municipalities. This act decentralizes
certain activities concerning the provision of care. Municipalities are obligated to
involve a number of stakeholders, amongst others patient organizations. Since this is
a recent development it remains to be seen how this policy works out in practice. It
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is clear, however, that at least a number of patient organizations do try to fulfill their
expected role on the local level (P8, P9). A little over a quarter of them now have
contacts with local government (P9).
In short, more and more tasks were assigned to and expected of patient
organizations, which most organizations try to take on board. Patient organizations
report that they participate in as many decision-making processes as possible, which
has led to a problem of overload. They are asked to participate in so many decision-
making procedures that they cannot cope with the demand. This applies especially
to smaller organizations, but larger organizations also experience this problem.
Nonetheless many patient organizations express a wish for even more participation
possibilities and increased government funding to enable them to play the role that
is expected from them (P8, P14, G18). However, the fact that all their efforts do not
lead to the powerful position they hoped for does lead to some frustration amongst
patient organizations (P5, P8, P14). Although they have been given many
opportunities to participate, patient organizations still experience a lot of difficulty
in actually influencing decisions.
The case of patient organizations in the Netherlands shows that access does not
necessarily equal influence (P14). For sure, there are shining examples of patient
organizations that managed to change health care for the better. The HIV
association and the Breast Cancer Association managed to change policy
concerning medication distribution, through lobbying and media utilization. The
Association for Muscular Diseases is generally acknowledged as a driving force
behind medical research in this area, since they are able to bring together experts
and patients for diseases that only strike a small number of people. But in general
patient organizations find it hard to influence decision-making processes. Most of
the interest representation activities consist of taking part in formal decision-making
procedures. This participation model can be described as neo-corporatist. Patient
organizations attribute their lack of influence to the fact that they remain in a
dependent position in this model; other actors in the field do not really need them to
make decisions. So whenever there is disagreement, the more powerful actors in
health care, such as insurers and providers, can easily disregard patient organization
representatives and continue anyway. Patient organizations can do little to prevent
this (P14). This effect is reported on participation in decision-making processes with
different actors. For instance, in the negotiations with insurers (patient organizations
operating as insurance purchasing groups), in decision-making processes on
research and in guideline development project teams (P5, P8, P10, P14). Patient
organizations sometimes feel that other actors can show off with a seal of approval
(approved by patient organization X!) while not allowing them a real say in the
process (P10, P14).
Ideology
Dutch government did not only steer the kind of activities patient organizations
should perform, it also tried to determine in advance what their input should be in
carrying out these participation activities; it tried to influence patient organizations’
ideology.
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From the very beginning government wanted patient organizations to be critical
towards the medical profession. Organizations of health care professionals
historically have a strong position in health care and patient organizations should
be supported to counter this position (G1, G3). However, most patient organizations
were founded in association with and supported by professional health care workers,
which led to a less than critical attitude among disease specific organizations
according to government (G1). Since health care workers and patients had
‘structural intrinsically conflicting interests’ this situation was deemed undesirable
(G1). In the early days of the patient movement a more critical attitude toward the
medical profession was displayed by general patient organizations (such as the non
disease specific Association for Child and Hospital), by client organizations in
mental health care and by general consumer organizations (which were active in
representing the interests of consumers on all kinds of markets besides health care)
(G1). The national platform that was founded in 1983 consisted of these critical
organizations (P8), which meant that the national platform of patients had the
desired critical attitude towards the health care profession.
In several policy documents the government emphasized that patient organiza-
tions should be ‘professionalized’ and that they should improve their expertise (G2,
G5, G12, G15, G17, G18). This professionalization also potentially affects the input
of patient organizations since it implies a shift in focus of these organizations, while
different knowledge and expertise is considered to be important. What the
government meant by professionalization was not always explained clearly, but it
seemed to entail at the least that organizations should have a proper administration,
that they ought to formulate policy goals, evaluate whether these goals were
accomplished and that they ought to be able to participate in the decision-making
bodies that the government wanted to open up for them. This meant that they should
have highly qualified volunteers, or hire educated personnel. Apparently the
experiential knowledge of the average patient active in a patient organization could
not deliver the input that government wanted from patient organizations. In
consultation with the NPCF government announced a coordinated education
program to improve patient organizations’ expertise (G5). In 2002 the government
concluded that the process of professionalization had taken place according to plan
(G16). An example of this professionalization can be seen in the board of the
umbrella organization NPCF. The board no longer consists of (former) patients with
experiential knowledge; several of its present members are business managers and
economists (www.npcf.nl). What the effect of this composition is has not been
properly researched yet. However, it is likely that the strong support for a market
based health care system of the NPCF (the National Patient and Consumer Feder-
ation was among the more ardent supporters of the plan) had something to do with
the composition of the board. Many disease specific organizations are trying very
hard to professionalize as well. It is agreed that participants need to be able to look
beyond their individual experiences, have strong negotiating skills and organiza-
tional, financial, medical and scientific knowledge to be able to talk to the other
actors at the negotiating table (P14). These organizations are therefore educating
their volunteers, they try to recruit highly educated volunteers and increasingly hire
professional employees, who are not expert patients themselves but have knowledge
Health Care Anal (2011) 19:329–351 341
123
about interest representation (P2, P8, P10, P14). A little over half of the disease
specific patient organizations still only work with volunteers. All other disease
specific organizations and the umbrella organizations have professionals working
for them to support their work (P9). Recently the minister of health care concluded
that this professionalization is not yet finished and more money is promised, so the
patient movement can become a more powerful, equal party in health care (G18).
Funding and Accountability
The Dutch government has put a lot of effort in steering patient organizations.
Funding these organizations has been the most important instrument to do so.
Patient organizations have increasingly been subsidized by the government from the
1980s onwards (G1, G3, G5, G8, G15, G16, G18). In 1996 the government created a
special fund to distribute subsidies among patient organizations (G9, G16). In the
beginning of the twenty-first century the amount of money to be distributed was
raised several times because of the new health care system in which a more
important role was expected of patient organizations (G10, G18).
Subsidizing patient organizations gave government the means to enforce
compliance and accountability. Granting subsidies entailed detailed supervision
on how the money was spent. Over the years the requirements connected to the
subsidies became increasingly far reaching. First of all patient organizations were
required to be transparent and representative (G15). Government wanted them to
especially focus on involving ethnic minorities for instance. In the policy paper
Choosing with Care it was explicitly stated that if patient organizations would not
comply with the government’s demands the minister would reconsider the subsidy
structure of the movement (G15). The financing structure has been changed several
times over the years to increase governmental influence. Since 2001 the government
has contemplated financing patient organizations ‘‘on the basis of performance’’
(G15). This financing structure was put into practice in 2006 and developed further
in 2007 (G18). Financing on the basis of performance meant that patient
organizations had to prove that they really performed the activities that were
expected from them. This accountability regime enlarged government control.
In the 2009 government plans, subsidies for patient organizations consist of
different parts. The first part is a basic subsidy, a second part is granted for
‘‘development purposes’’. The criteria for this latter part of the subsidy are not clear
yet; they will be established in consultation with ‘‘the field’’, i.e. with represen-
tatives of patient organizations (G21). Thirdly patient organizations can apply for
project subsidies. If they want to apply for a project subsidy they must draw up a
4-year plan in which they explain how their activities fit within certain subjects
delineated by the government (G19).
Almost all patient organizations apply for government funding (P8). Moreover,
patient organizations want government subsidies to increase because they feel they
need more money to be able to perform the tasks that are expected from them
(P8, P10). Since they are expected to play this role by the government, they tend to
think that the government should enable them to do so by giving them the necessary
financial means. And as they need these finances to perform all their activities they
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accept that they have to respond to all kinds of government demands to receive
these subsidies. Research shows that patient organizations are satisfied with the
opportunities to influence decision-making given to them by the government. The
great majority of patient organizations comply with governmental demands without
protest (P8).
Conclusion and Discussion
Patient organizations today are quite different from the ones that were founded in
the 1980s. Their organizational make-up, their activities and their input in decision-
making have changed substantially. We have shown that these changes have been
influenced if not brought about by the Dutch government. Government policy
granted patient organizations an insider group status. Government policy directed at
patient organizations has had a consistent focus over the years. Subsequent
governments of different political colour have supported patient organizations so as
to strengthen the position of patients and to transform them into a countervailing
power to health care providers and insurers. This policy consistency can be
explained by the fact that strengthening the position of patients is broadly
considered to appeal to certain values such as self development and democracy,
examples of post material interests which many Dutch political parties support. This
may apply less to the moderately conservative Christian Democratic Party which
was part of government during most of this period, but then this party has always
cherished civil society which may explain their ongoing interest in patient
organizations. Thus supporting patient organizations fits nicely with widely shared
values of different political parties. Furthermore, the fact that subsequent
governments aimed to change the health care system into a more demand driven
system during this entire period can also explain the continuous interest in patient
organizations. The system based on regulated competition that was introduced in
2006 was the result of a reform process that had been on the agenda for over
20 years [25]. Strengthening the position of patient organizations was and is seen as
an important part of the reform process.
Although government itself at one point announced that it should practice
restraint in influencing patient organizations [51, 52] we conclude that its influence
on patient organizations has been quite substantial. Of course it is widely
acknowledged that the opportunity structure of civil society organizations is
influenced by government. It can create incentives for them to behave in certain
ways [21, 35]. In this case however government influence is far reaching and does
more than just create opportunities to influence decision-making in a certain way.
Government successfully steered different aspects of patient organizations by
subsidizing and facilitating them. Most patient organizations seem to resign to the
new procedures. The government has given them a position they can hardly refuse
as they are given the opportunity to represent the interests of their members and
their ‘constituency’ (people who suffer from a disease but did not join the patient
organization) in all kinds of decision-making processes. In order to reach this
position they professionalize, they merge, they present a united front and they
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perform the administrative tasks required to apply for subsidy money. Many patient
organizations even ask for more participation possibilities and more government
subsidies to enable them to perform all the activities expected from them [58, 50,
56]. They acknowledge that they are not an equal party in health care as the
government would like them to be, and ask for more support to realize their full
potential. Numerous intermediary organizations, researchers and members of
parliament support this plea to increase participation possibilities and expand
support for patient organizations. Most research into the current state of patient
participation in the Netherlands concludes that the process is ‘starting off’, but that
more opportunities should be created, more support should be granted and that
patient organizations should professionalize further (see for instance [20, 34, 39,
60]).
Although we sympathize with certain aspects of this evaluation, we feel that
more attention should be paid to the disadvantages of governmental interference in
civil society. We will therefore discuss both the positive and negative aspects in the
following section.
The situation we described in our article has some positive effects for the
different actors involved. A first positive aspect relates to the importance of public
accountability. From a societal (taxpayer’s) perspective, one may appreciate that
government keeps a check on how public money is spent. Public accountability is an
important aspect of democratic governance; it is generally felt that government
needs to be transparent about its decisions and its expenditures [10]. Thus, it is
important that patient organizations are transparent about how they spend public
money.
Secondly, organizing patient participation has proven a useful and successful
steering mechanism for the Dutch government. It was part of their policy to
strengthen the position of patients and reform the health care system into a demand
driven system, with an aim to make it more effective and democratic. In such a
system patients should behave like consumers who critically assess the care that is
provided and who have a voice in decisions concerning their care. Patient
organizations can play an important role in critically following health care, since it
is felt that individual patients cannot do this alone. Strong patient organizations
could be a countervailing power to the other parties on the health care market. It is
also felt that strengthening patient organizations makes health care decision-making
more democratic, since important stakeholders in health care are present at the
decision-making table. Interestingly strong patient organizations could also cause
problems for government should they oppose government policy. Nevertheless the
government has repeatedly asked patient organizations to follow its own role
critically. One might conclude that the government has created its own friendly
opposition by subsidizing and facilitating patient organizations, which may be a
good thing from the government’s perspective (although not necessarily from the
patients’ point of view). Patient organizations might feel free to follow the
government critically (having been invited to do so after all), but the fact that they
are not known to vehemently oppose the government [35, 50, 56], could also be
caused by this same policy. After all it seems harsh and less than polite to really bite
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the hand that feeds you. From a Machiavellistic perspective one may applaud this
strategy as very effective.
The situation can also be valued as positive because it gives patients the
opportunity to influence health care decision-making. Strengthening the position of
patients in relation to health care providers, insurers and the pharmaceutical industry
has been recognized as important in many countries [3, 13, 22]. One of the means to
do this is offering patient organizations the opportunity to speak on behalf of
patients. Government policy in the Netherlands has given patient organizations
access to all kinds of decision-making structures which otherwise would have been
closed to them, or at least more difficult to conquer. Since one of the goals of patient
organizations now is, albeit through government interference, representing the
interests of their members, the participation possibilities facilitated by the
government give them a means to accomplish their goal. Although patient
organizations find it hard to really influence decision-making [58], thanks to
government facilitation patient organizations in the Netherlands now at least have
the opportunity to voice their opinion on different subjects.
Another advantage is the empowerment of people who are active in these
organizations. Participation is a way to increase their social capital [58, 50]. People
otherwise left out in society are integrated and can participate in society again
(ibid.). The active role of patient organizations therefore has positive effects on the
individual level as well and can be part of a more general policy trend to create
involved democratically skilled citizens [13, 41].
A last obvious advantage of government sponsorship is that this policy at least
partly prevents influence by the pharmaceutical industry. Without government
subsidies patient organizations would have to search for other financial sources and
turning to the pharmaceutical industry for funds would then be a much more
attractive option. This might leave the door open for patient organizations to be
influenced by the industry. Sponsorship by the pharmaceutical industry is frowned
upon both in the Netherlands and in other countries because of the danger of being
influenced [9, 27, 32]. Although the exact influence of industry on patient
organizations is often not clear, and it is possible that their interests coincide, there
is a lot of uneasiness about this relationship which can negatively affect the
perception of the ability of patient organizations to speak for patients [27].
Therefore it may be important to avoid such ties.
Thus there are several reasons to evaluate the policy course in the Netherlands
positively, particularly when we compare this situation to other countries. In
comparison patient organizations are strongly embedded in decision-making
structures in the Netherlands. However, there are also negative effects attached to
Dutch government policy regarding patient organizations.
First of all the effect of goal replacement can be identified. Patient organizations
have changed substantially over the years. Most of them were founded to provide
peer support and information for fellow sufferers. At present an important part of
the work of patient organizations consists of interest representation in formal
decision-making structures. Whereas individual contacts with fellow sufferers were
the primary focus before, at present patient representatives find themselves
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participating in all kinds of committees and project groups and producing papers to
justify their expenses. Within these interest representation activities further changes
can be identified. Whereas the original idea was that patients should improve the
decision-making process by introducing their experiential knowledge, this is now
pushed to the background due to the professionalization of patient organizations
[58]. Professional staff members recruited by patient organizations now do their
very best to know whatever it is that the other parties at the bargaining table know
also, be it medical technical stuff, economic insights or bargaining strategies.
Although this enables them to talk to the other parties at the table, it raises important
representativeness issues. Professional interest groups can diminish the democratic
potential of such groups, since they distance themselves from the people they claim
to represent [48].
A second negative aspect is that the government’s policy ties the hands of patient
organizations. As was stated earlier it is difficult to criticize government policy
when one receives government funding and has to meet all kinds of criteria attached
to these subsidies. Their relationship with government puts patient organizations in
a vulnerable position. It makes it more difficult for them to follow their own agenda
and raise the issues patients really find important since they join existing structures.
This applies especially when it concerns subjects that oppose government policy.
Thirdly patient organizations have become policy and strategy followers due to
their institutionalized position. Institutionalization diminishes the potential of
protest [1, 21]. Because of all the possibilities to participate in formal decision-
making processes opened up to them patient organizations are known to make little
use of more oppositional strategies such as demonstrations and the use of the media
[34, 50]. They follow both the agenda and the strategies proposed by the
government [50, 58]. Whether they are really able to influence decision-making in a
neo-corporatist decision-making model can be questioned (ibid.). Nederland et al.
show that relying on official institutional channels makes patient organizations less
effective than they might otherwise be [34].
Another negative effect is a loss of empowerment. Although patient organizations
provide active members with an opportunity for empowerment and with a chance to
increase their social capital, an effect which was also partly created because of
government policy, the policy directed at professionalizing these organizations may
put this effect in jeopardy again. To be able to participate in all kinds of formal
complicated decision-making procedures patient organizations now search for
highly educated volunteers or professional employees, which means that not
everybody can become active in a patient organization anymore [58]. The
continuing government involvement and the extra government demands may undo
the positive effect created by the initial government policy directed at patient
organizations.
Lastly one may plausibly argue that patient organizations are being put to
instrumental use by the government. Patient organizations are part of a
governmental strategy to reach certain policy goals. The question is whether so
much government influence on civil society is desirable. Civil society organizations
are considered important for democracy because they give citizens a means to let
their voices be heard [2, 15, 19, 61]. It is argued that it is important for a viable
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democracy to maintain a balance in society between the state, civil society and the
market [63]. Too much government interference in civil society organizations may
disrupt the balance.
Lessons for the Future
So what can we learn from the Dutch situation? Government policy directed at
patient organizations in the Netherlands has positive effects. It ensures public
accountability, it provides the government with a successful steering mechanism, it
offers patient organizations a chance to participate in health care decision-making, it
opens up opportunities for empowerment for active members of patient organiza-
tions and it keeps patient organizations largely out of the hands of the
pharmaceutical industry. All of this might be sufficient reason to consider a similar
policy in other countries. The downsides of the Dutch model should also carry some
weight though. Too much governmental steering may lead to goal displacement in
patient organizations, ties their hands, makes patient organizations agenda and
strategy followers rather than agenda setters, undoes the empowerment effect and
may put patient organizations to instrumental use. These disadvantages tell every
other government that considers this strategy [3, 31] to proceed with caution. Of
course no funding source is free of dilemmas [27] and the fact that a policy has
certain disadvantages does not necessarily have to lead to the conclusion that it
should be abolished. When evaluating a certain policy it is also important to
consider the alternatives. In this case the alternative would be that patient
organizations would have far more difficulty in gaining access to certain decision-
making processes. It would also leave them far more vulnerable to interference from
the pharmaceutical industry. The situation in many other countries shows that
patient organizations in the Netherlands are comparatively well off. Government
interference may well be preferable if the alternative would be sponsorship by the
pharmaceutical industry. However, we feel there is no need to simply accept the
disadvantages of government sponsorship because the most obvious alternative
would be far worse. We think that measures can be taken to improve the situation.
An important means to do this is the creation of a more independent financial
source for patient organizations. Government might consider providing patient
organizations with a basic subsidy that comes with fewer strings attached. Some
broad criteria could be taken into account to ensure accountability for the spending
of tax payers money, such as providing some insight into the activities and why they
are relevant for their members. Making legislation that ensures this subsidy for a
longer period can further free patient organizations from too much government
involvement. This way, patient organizations have more room to decide for
themselves what they find important. They might decide to focus once more on the
core tasks for which they were founded originally; peer support and providing
information, the tasks many patient organizations themselves still consider to be
most important [38]. Or they may decide to focus on contributing experiential
knowledge in their participation activities instead of professionalizing by familiar-
izing themselves with the expertise of other parties. This might be quite difficult
since patient organizations join long established decision-making processes which
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have certain modes of conduct. However, since listening to the patient’s voice and
valuing the patient’s input is generally considered important in health care, this
could be the way to accomplish just that. Patient organizations could also consider
other influence strategies such as more activist ones instead of participating in
formal decision-making procedures. Again it is important to consider the
alternative; in the current situation there is access but this does not equal influence
[58]. It is therefore questionable whether the goals of more effective and democratic
decision-making are reached in the current situation.
Such a policy of governmental restraint would mean that government would lose
an effective steering mechanism. On the other hand subsidizing civil society into
obedience and compliance might be something a government in a democratic
country should not be willing to do in the first place. Freedom of association is an
important right in a democratic state, which can only be assured when government
does not interfere with it too much. Although it is hard to pinpoint the exact
boundaries to justified government assistance to civil society, practicing restraint for
the sake of civil society’s independence might do credit to the government [50].
Accompanying these decisions in policy practice we think it could also be
worthwhile to pay scientific attention to ties between civil society and the state. This
debate is important because, as stated before, our case study does not stand alone. A
similar role for patient organizations is considered in other countries [3, 31].
Furthermore, similar ties between government and civil society exist in other policy
sectors, for instance between government and ethnic minority organizations [30, 43].
Another example is political parties which according to some have even moved from
being part of civil society to being part of the state [33]. When these organizations are
seen as important for a viable democracy because they offer groups a means to
influence decision-making, they should be given the opportunity to play this role. Too
much government influence can prevent them from doing so. It seems high time to start
a debate on the limits to government interference in civil society.
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